Philosophical problems in Library and Information Science (LIS)

In most fields in the social sciences are researchers who prefer quantitative research methods while other prefer qualitative methods. Such preferences for specific methods are part of the philosophical problems in a field, especially the field known as epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge. Many epistemological theories, points of view or positions exist (See Epistemological lifeboat: Positions). Many of those positions have supporters within Library and Information Science (LIS), why it should be useful to understand the fundamental arguments of the most important of them. This relation between LIS and philosophy is similar to most other social sciences.

 

There is, however, another reason, why philosophical problems are important for LIS. LIS is a "meta-science" in that it is concerned with communication of knowledge produced by other sciences (just as education, for example, is concerned with the teaching of knowledge produced by other fields). LIS is thus part of the metasciences and deeply depending on the other metasciences (especially sociology of science and philosophy of science).

 

Often are philosophical problems in LIS misunderstood as psychological problems. User studies study how users behave, but this explained as psychological phenomena which are connected to the brain. When users search information or knowledge in order to solve a problem, they are, however, epistemological subjects. What is right information is what help solve the problem, not what users tend to believe, and certainly not what they tend to believe due to stable properties of their minds or brains. So, it must be claimed that epistemological problems have been confused with psychological problems, which have caused stagnation in the field. 

 

Peters (1977, p. 197-198) mentions that Dewey Decimal Classification be seen as an expression of a rationalist philosophy, while Library of Congress Classification is an expression of an empiricist philosophy. In a comment to a paper on relevance by Saracevics he mentions (op.cit., p. 199) the research in relevance might be given a new dimension by regarding the users as more or less rationalist, empiricist or critical oriented.

 

A part of the philosophical debate in LIS has been connected to Popper's "world three"

World one knowledge: the natural world of knowledge forms the source of knowledge and it consists of things like books, stones and brain cells; World two knowledge: the mental world of knowledge is about our thoughts and ideas. World three knowledge: the stated or expressed world of knowledge is based on what humankind has chosen to represent as knowledge including the artifacts. This theory has been discussed by, for example, Brookes (1980).

 

The most influential philosophy in LIS is probably Thomas Kuhn's (1962) theory of scientific development and the role of scientific "paradigms". (This is among the 100 highest cited papers in LIS). 

 

 

 

 

to be edited:

 Ingen af disse diskussioner har imidlertid præget informationsvidenskabens teori på nogen dybtgående måde. Dele af klassifikationsforskningen (f.eks. Dahlberg, 1974) har ligeledes haft en filosofisk tilgang uden tilstrækkelig kontinuitet.

Hjørland (1992) viser, at den vidensopfattelse, som f.eks. Langridge' indexeringsteori bygger på er klart rationalistisk og idealistisk: Viden antages at eksisterer i evige og uforanderlige former, som indexerings­virksomheden retter sig imod. Dette er ukorrekt: Den menneskelige viden udvikles løbende, og de grundlæggende filosofiske kategorier er kun relativt stabile. Indexeringsvirksomheden retter sig ikke mod evige, uforanderlige "ideer", men mod at betragte konkrete dokumenters erkendelsesmæssige potentialer i relation til den menneskelige praksis. Hjørland (ssts.) hævder, at ikke blot indexeringsteori, men selve opfattelsen af begrebet "emne" kan føres tilbage til filosofi­ske grund­positioner samt at en kvalificeret-realistisk vidensopfattelse kan løse op for informations­videnskabens teoretiske krise.
 


Literature:

 

Brookes, B. C. (1980). The Foundations of Information Science, Part 1: Philosophical aspects. Journal of Information Science, 2(3/4), 1980, side 125-133.
 

Capurro, R. (1986). Hermeneutik der Fachinformation. München: Verlag Karl Alber.
 

Capurro, R. (1992). What is information science for? A philosophical reflection. IN: Conceptions of Library and information science. Historical, empirical and theoretical perspectives. London: Taylor Graham, 82-96.
 

Catudal, J. N. (1990). What philosophy can offer to information science: the example of medical expert systems. Interacting with Computers, Vol. 2(2), 131-146.
 

Dahlberg, I. (1974). Grundlagen universaler Wissensordnung. Probleme und Möglichkeiten eines universalen Klassifikationssystem des Wissens. München: Verlag Dokumentation.
 

Dahlberg, I. (1987). Classification and philosophy. International Classification, 14(1), 1. (editorial).
 

Griffith, B. C. (1979). Science literature - how faulty a mirror of science? Aslib Proceedings, 31, 381-391.
 

Hjørland, B. (1992). The Concept of "Subject" in Information Science. Journal of Documentation, 48(2), 172-200.
 

Hoel, I. (1992). Information science and hermeneutics - should information science be interpreted as a historical and humanistic science? IN: Conceptions of Library and Information Science. Edited by Pertti Vakkari & Blaise Cronin. London: Taylor Graham, 69-81.

 

Kemp, D. A. (1976). Philosophy and knowledge. IN: D. A. Kemp: The Nature of Knowledge. An introduction for librarians. London: Clive Bingley.
 

Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Dansk udgave: Videnskabens revolutioner. Kbh.: Fremad, 1973).
 

Peters, P. E. (1977). Philosophy of Science. IN: Encyclopedia of Library and Information Science. Vol. 22. Ed. by Allen Kent & Harold Lancour. New York: Marcel Dekker. (Pp. 183-207).
 

Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach. Oxford: Clarenton Press.


Refinetti, R. (1989). Information processing as a central issue in philosophy of science. Information Processing and Management, 25, 583-584.
 

Rudd, D. (1983). Do we really need World III? Information Science with or without Popper. Journal of Information Science Principles and Practice, 7, 99-105.

 

Wilson T. D. (2003). Philosophical foundations and research relevance: issues for information research. Journal of Information Science, 29(6), 445-452
 

Winograd, T. & Flores, F. (1986). Understanding Computers and Cognition. A New Foundation for Design. New York: Addison-Wesley.

 

 

See also: Information science, related fields
 

 

 

Birger Hjørland

Last edited: 31-01-2006

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